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INTRODUCTION
Since the American Law Institute (ALI) launched in the early twentieth century,
its mission has been “the clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs . . . [and] to secure the better administration of justice.”1
A principal way it has pursued that mission has been through its Restatements of
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Law project.2 By their nature, Restatements of Law reflect tensions between what it
means to “restate” and reform the law. As the ALI has grown and the legal profession
has evolved with social and political changes, the organization has ensured
professionalism and the incorporation of diverse views to manage this tension at the
heart of its Restatement projects.
Against this backdrop, the ALI announced in 2014 that it would begin a
Restatement of Copyright Law project in 2015 and we, as copyright lawyers and
scholars, applaud that decision.3 The ALI specified that the project
will focus on the generally applicable parts of copyright law, including the subject
matter of copyright; the scope of the exclusive rights granted by copyright; copyright
‘formalities’; the rules governing ownership and transfer of copyrights; the duration of
copyright; the standard for copyright infringement; rules regarding the circumvention
of copyright protection systems; defenses to copyright infringement, including the first
sale limitation and fair use; and remedies, including actual and statutory damages,
attorney[’s] fees, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; and criminal penalties.4

Since this announcement, the Restatement of Copyright Law project has been a
lightning rod for controversy. The Authors Guild, the Association of American
Publishers, the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Industry
Association of America, and fourteen other organizations wrote to the ALI
expressing the worry that “the conception of the project and the recent appointment
of its Reporter indicate a significant risk that it would be used as a vehicle not to
restate the law of copyright, but, rather, to rewrite it to benefit a particular viewpoint
in the copyright debate.”5 The Acting Register of Copyrights wrote to the ALI that
the Restatement project is “misguided” and that “[t]he need for the Restatement is
unclear, as an extensive body of positive copyright law already exists.”6 The
Copyright & Literary Property Committee of the New York City Bar Association
prepared a report against the project on the basis that “rather than simply clarifying
or restating that law, the draft offers commentary and interpretations beyond the
current state of the law that appear intended to shape current and future copyright
policy.”7 The head of the National Music Publishers’ Association called the project
a “sham attempt to undermine hard fought principles of understood law” and urged
that “[t]his thinly-veiled attempt to subvert the law and undermine creators . . . must

2. See infra Part I.
3. The American Law Institute Announces Four New Projects, AM. LAW INST. (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://perma.cc/E6S5-827N.
4. Id.
5. Letter from Am. Photographic Artists et al. to ALI Officers and Dirs. (Oct. 14, 2015),
https://perma.cc/3BS3-M7KS.
6. Letter from Karyn Temple Claggett, Acting Reg. of Copyrights, to ALI President David Levi
et al., Re: Council Draft No. 1, Restatement of the Law, Copyright (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZC6723X7.
7. COPYRIGHT & LITERARY PROP. COMM., RECOMMENDATION TO REJECT THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PROPOSAL TO CREATE A RESTATEMENT OF LAW, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://perma.cc/GG89-DXYV.
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be stopped.”8 And just last year, five members of Congress criticized the project,
noting that “laws created through federal statute, including federal copyright law, are
ill-suited for treatment in a Restatement because the law is clearly articulated by
Congress in both the statute and the legislative history.”9 They elaborated that “any
Restatement or other treatise relied on by courts that attempts to diminish the
importance of the statutory text or legislative history relating to that text would
warrant concern.”10 Furthermore, they asserted that “[c]ourts should rely on that
statutory text and legislative history, not Restatements that attempt to replace the
statutory language and legislative history established by Congress with novel
interpretations.”11
Some commentators have expressed skepticism that these critiques are honest.
Instead, they suspect that they are a smoke screen for critics’ fears that a Restatement
of Copyright Law would provide an understanding of copyright law that would
undermine the ability of content creators and others to shape the law in their favor.12
Whatever the truth, for purposes of this Article, we accept the critics at their word.
And we think their criticisms of the Restatement of Copyright Law project are
exaggerated and mistaken. As we contend herein, the act of restating in the manner
that is the ALI’s signature form is consistent with the practice of law generally, which
inevitably involves acts of legal exposition and interpretation.13 It is not inherently
partisan but a professional practice in which all lawyers are taught to engage. Stating
the law, saying what it means, and then applying it in a particular context are what
lawyers and judges do all the time. In this way, restating—or “retelling”—the law
is both normal and inevitable. A restatement of law is another way of saying what
the law is.
To be sure, copyright law is grounded in a federal statute, while the more common
ALI Restatements of the Law, such as the Restatements of Contracts and Torts, are

8. Chris Cooke, Music Industry Hits Out at American Law Institute’s ‘Restatement’ of Copyright
Law, COMPLETE MUSIC UPDATE (Oct. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/YBN5-3MQU.
9. Letter from Sen. Thom Tillis, Rep. Ben Cline, Rep. Theodore E. Deutch, Rep. Martha Roby,
and Rep. Harley Rouda to ALI Dir. Richard L. Revesz (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/LWE9-3YYZ
[hereinafter Letter from Sen. Tillis et al.].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Brian L. Frye (@brianlfrye), TWITTER (Dec. 5, 2019, 3:15 PM EST),
https://twitter.com/brianlfrye/status/1202683033595400194 (“I find it deeply amusing that the primary
objection to the restatement of copyright is that the ALI is insufficiently captured by industry insiders.
Quel dommage.”); Mark McKenna (@markpmckenna), TWITTER (Dec. 5, 2019, 1:54 PM EST),
https://twitter.com/markpmckenna/status/1202662535033507841 (“[T]hat’s why opposition without
seeing the drafts seems clearly ideological. The rest of what you say (deep disagreement, etc) doesn’t
distinguish copyright from other areas, like, say, torts.”); Brandon Butler (@bc_butler), TWITTER (Dec.
5, 2019, 7:38 AM EST), https://twitter.com/bc_butler/status/1202567936034136064 (“The copyright
rent-seeker lobby’s anxiety over the Restatement should be seen for what it is: an expression of sheer
terror that copyright will be authoritatively explained by experts who have never been and will never be
on their payroll.”); cf. Brandon Butler (@bc_butler), TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2019, 10:12 AM EST),
https://twitter.com/bc_butler/status/1204056189643841537 (sarcastically stating that “[w]e can’t have a
Restatement of Copyright because the professionals at the Copyright Office are the only people we can
trust to give an unbiased, expert explanation of—oh”).
13. See infra Part II.
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based in common law.14 These previous Restatements helped guide interstate
practice and coordinate legal development across the fifty states. The 1976
Copyright Act, the principal federal statute governing copyright law, may be a single
federal statute for the whole nation, but its development over forty years by courts in
thirteen separate circuits through thousands upon thousands of cases has not always
been uniform or crystal clear. The 1976 Copyright Act both draws on longstanding
common law elucidated by federal courts and uses language indicating Congress
intended for courts to continue expounding the common law in essential ways.15
Moreover, as Congress intimated when it enacted the 1976 Act, it was enacting a
copyright statute for the ages. In four decades, Congress has not returned to revise
the central aspects of the law to which the ALI Restatement of Copyright Law now
turns its attention. This confirms that it was intended for long-range judicial
interpretation subject to complex and diverse doctrinal evolution. For these reasons,
we should welcome a carefully crafted Restatement of Copyright Law to help courts
and lawyers ascertain the central rules of copyright law as they have evolved over
the past forty years.
The provisions at issue in the draft Restatement of Copyright Law on which ALI
membership will vote at ALI’s upcoming annual meeting are central to copyright
doctrine and have been the subject of numerous court decisions over the past several
decades of technological and industry change: originality, fixation, categories of
copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, and authorship and
ownership.16 This abundance of legal activity on copyright law demonstrates the
value to the profession of this project retelling copyright. In contrast to the dramatic
criticism of this Restatement project alleging political capture or illegitimate law
reform, the draft’s provisions are routine and straightforward. They will surprise no
one and are almost boring in their adherence to and synthesis of the copyright statute
and judicial interpretations of it. Far from being radical or ill-advised, the
Restatement of Copyright Law is a reasonable and welcome addition to the work of
the ALI.
Part I of this Article situates the current Restatement of Copyright Law in the
historical context of other ALI projects, drawing parallels in their purposes,
processes, and political tensions. Part II describes the controversy over a “retelling”
of copyright law as misguided insofar as it fails to account for the practice of
interpretation as part of the practice of law that is constrained by professional
standards. Part III describes the analysis and exposition of the provisions of the draft
portions of the Restatement of Copyright Law presented to the ALI membership for
discussion and vote this year as unremarkable but also beneficial, achieving the
ALI’s goals of clarification and simplification of the sprawling federal case law
interpreting and applying the 1976 Copyright Act.

14. As described in Part I in more detail, not all ALI projects are restatements based in common
law, however.
15. See infra Part III.
16. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 8, 2020)
[hereinafter Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020)].
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THE PROJECT OF RESTATEMENTS

The ALI’s history and structure have been described in numerous articles.17
Notable among these histories is a debate about whether the ALI’s purpose is
properly understood as describing the law or proposing reform. As summarized
below, this debate began with the ALI’s origins. The initial “‘pragmatic reformist’
drive of [its] founders” remains a critical feature of the ALI and an enduring source
of tension.18 Other controversies surrounding ALI projects over the course of the
twentieth century relate to this tension, and some are simply the product of an
evolving and growing membership organization whose structure is intentionally
deliberative and democratic. The tensions endemic to democratic institutions—
charges of hierarchy and elitism, problems of exclusivity and lack of diversity, and
the scope and substance of the public interest—have plagued the ALI over the
decades. The Restatement of Copyright Law project may therefore produce similar
tensions, but they arise because of the nature of the ALI, not because of the nature of
copyright law.
The ALI explains its mission as “the clarification and simplification of the law
and its better adaptation to social needs . . . [and] to secure the better administration
of justice.”19 This mission dates back to 1906, when the idea of the ALI was first
proposed, well before it was founded in 1923.20 As described in a critical history of
the ALI, the ALI originated from a struggle circa 1906 between the American Bar
Association (ABA) member lawyers and the American Association of Law Schools
(AALS) member law professors.21 The disagreement was not over the necessity of
an organization devoted to clarifying the sprawling terrain of judicial decisions. That
important purpose was understood and accepted. Rather, it was over the nature of
law that was to be clarified. Today, we recall this debate as the beginning of the
jurisprudential shift from legal formalism to legal realism; but, at the time, the
disagreements were personal and described as pitting an “old guard” of
“conservative” practitioners against “progressive-minded,” “younger men.”22
The leader of the “progressive-minded” lawyers was thirty-eight-year-old Roscoe
Pound, then dean of University of Nebraska Law School. When Pound gave a speech
at an ABA meeting in 1906 criticizing the growing imprecision of legal decisionmaking, he pleaded for law to be more responsive to the evolution of social and
economic life.23 The growing inconsistencies among legal decisions across the
17. Some notable histories include Alex Elson, The Case for an In-Depth Study of the American
Law Institute, 23 LAW & SOC. INQ. 625 (1998); N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective
on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55 (1990); see also John P. Frank, The
American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615 (1998).
18. Elson, supra note 17, at 627; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, The Political Economy
of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1995) (critiquing the ALI and National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as private legislatures despite the fact that, according to the
authors, politics should not influence either organization).
19. See How the Institute Works, supra note 1.
20. Hull, supra note 17, at 56.
21. Id. at 56–58.
22. Id. at 57–58.
23. Id. at 56–57.
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country were as much a result of legal formalism’s rigidity as they were a function
of the vast accumulation of cases across diverse populations and rapidly changing
circumstances of modern industrialism at the turn of the century.24 Pound’s speech
was ill-received at the ABA, but several law professors in attendance were energized
and saw an opportunity “to do something about it in [their] own limited spheres.”25
Accompanying Pound on this mission was John Henry Wigmore (dean of
Northwestern Law School), William Draper Lewis (founding dean of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School and director of the ALI from its founding to 1947), and
George Boke of the University of California at Berkeley.26 Their initial plan in 1906
eventually came to fruition after much consternation and compromise in 1923.
The years spanning 1906 to 1923 were full of tensions reflecting the ALI’s
original and enduring purpose. Though the skirmishes do not need detailed
recounting here, in general they concerned the evolving role of law schools in
training lawyers for practice or as scholars in jurisprudence and legal history.27
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld of Yale Law School was at the center of this debate. As
recounted by one historian, “[t]he essence of [Hohfeld’s] plan was the new-found
self-importance of the legal academic. . . . [He] complained, ‘the majority of the
universities have . . . been content to offer purely professional or vocational courses
in law along conventional lines—what is commonly called general jurisprudence
being entirely, or almost entirely, ignored.”28 Hohfeld’s idea was that some law
schools would provide the research and theory on which better understanding of the
law and suggestions for its reform could rely. This proposal led to debates with the
AALS that were tinged with, among other things, not-so-subtle classism, racism, and
xenophobia that threatened less prestigious law schools and those with night
programs aimed at first-generation students with second-class status.29 The reform
effort to establish a law institute that could improve an understanding of the law and
advance the administration of justice reproduced within law schools many of the
destructive social and political hierarchies outside the profession and in society at
large.30
World War I interrupted the debate and, at the war’s end, resulted in compromise.
The ALI would be independent from law schools; but it would be comprised of
members from the legal academy who had time to devote to the project, as well as
judges and practicing lawyers who would add professional legitimacy to the
project.31 The leaders of this compromise were Elihu Root, Secretary of State under
Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene Gilmore, professor of law at University of

24. Id.
25. Id. at 58.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 70–72.
28. Id. at 59.
29. Id. at 63.
30. Cf. Richard Yeselson, The Return of the 1920s, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2015),
https://perma.cc/SWC8-NKYF (comparing polarization of the 2010s to that of the 1920s after a period of
rapid industrialization, restructuring of labor and professions, and drastic increase in wealth inequality).
31. Hull, supra note 17, at 72.
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Wisconsin Law School and president of the AALS.32 The story is more complicated
and involves an inspiring speech at an annual AALS meeting by then-New York
Court of Appeals Judge Benjamin Cardozo, who “persuasively represented the
perspective of a working judge [and] the desire by judges themselves for the
clarification and reform of the law now contemplated by the law professors.”33
Ultimately, compromise occurred, and when the ALI was founded in 1923, it had
evolved into “an active, independent organization of law professors, lawyers, and
judges dedicated to progressive law reform.”34
While the First Restatement project cautiously reflected this compromise with a
“dogmatic affirmation” of black letter law, the subsequent Second Restatement
project reflected the maturity of ALI’s purpose.35 It contained more exposition and
analysis and was geared more toward elucidating majority and minority views and
recommending an optimal path.36 Herbert Wechsler, the director of the ALI at midcentury for the Second Restatement project, “took a more active reformist position,”
asserting “that what courts do in a given situation cannot be divorced from the view
of what they ought to do.”37
The ALI’s goal all along was “reform,” but what that means has evolved. It
started as clarification and harmonization by reflecting more everyday and
particularized experience instead of adhering to abstract principles. Intermittent
skirmishes during the twentieth century over the ALI’s elitism and exclusivity,
present at its beginning and continuing throughout the century, ignited further
debates over the meaning of reform by asking “reform for whom?” By the mid- to
late-twentieth century, characteristic controversies concerned special-interest
lobbying, member-client conflicts, and political preferences of member factions.38
These debates were about, for example: whether ALI lawyer members do in fact
“leave their clients at the door”39; whether membership is appropriately intellectually
diverse and informed by expertise beyond law (such as in economics and urban
policy)40; and whether membership was sufficiently representative of the bar as a
whole.41 Studies of the ALI recount special-interest lobbying of members by specific

32. Id. at 74.
33. Id. at 73.
34. Id. at 69.
35. Elson, supra note 17, at 628.
36. Id.; see also Bennet Boskey, The American Law Institute: A Glimpse at Its Future, 12 GREEN
BAG 2d, at 255, 257 (2009).
37. Elson, supra note 17, at 628.
38. Id. at 629.
39. AM LAW INST., COUNCIL R. 9.04 (“To maintain the Institute’s reputation for thoughtful,
disinterested analysis of legal issues, members are expected to leave client interests at the door. Members
should speak and vote on the basis of their personal and professional convictions and experience without
regard to client interests or self-interest.”); see also Lawrence J. Fox, Leave Your Clients at the Door, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 608 (1998) (describing special-interest lobbying of members by insurance
company clients with reference to the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers); Charles W. Wolfram,
Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV 817, 821–28 (1998) (recounting
the same).
40. Elson, supra note 17, at 633.
41. Id.
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industries (such as insurance), especially with regard to corporate governance,
products liability, and the law of lawyers.42 These controversies were largely
resolved with rule changes clarifying the ALI’s mission to serve the public interest,
by enlarging its membership to include legal academics with specific expertise, and
by reaffirming adherence to professional standards of the independent “lawyer
statesman.”43 To be sure, these standards may weaken as time goes on.44 And as the
ALI grows in size, while it may be more diverse along relevant qualities (including
subject-matter expertise, geography, ethnicity, gender, professional experience, and
affiliation), it also may become more unwieldy, generating more contestation and
disagreement.
Today, the ALI has over 3,500 members with an elaborate and layered process
for drafting, revising, and approving Restatements.45 The size and complexity of this
process have led critics to ask whether it produces effective collaboration and
deliberation.46 Others have suggested that the ALI is in essence a private legislature,
but without the error correction and accountability mechanisms legislative processes
assure.47 Both of these criticisms challenge the core mission of the ALI to provide
clarifying and accurate legal expertise on which judges and lawyers may rely. But
these problems are endemic to any influential and expert organization grounded in
principles of diversity and professionalism that continues to grow in size, not to the
ALI specifically. And, although it may be true that the ALI is not accountable to its
constituents the way legislatures are, there is no reason to believe that the ALI’s
members—and the Reporters and Advisors doing the lion’s share of the drafting
work—are not as good (or bad) as legislators at finding facts and collecting empirical
data useful for analyzing and expounding the law. Moreover, the transparency of the
ALI process and its layers of membership review provide meaningful measures of
accountability and create ample information with which to evaluate the merits of the
final product on which the ALI’s reputation and authority depend. After all, a
Restatement is not binding on courts or legislatures.48 Its persuasiveness resides in
the quality of its procedural layers of review and the rigor, expertise, and
professionalism of its members.
The ALI’s success over the years has led to its expansion beyond Restatements to
the development of Principles and Model Codes. These have included influential
projects such as the Uniform Commercial Code, the Model Penal Code, Model Code
of Evidence, and less successful ones such as recommendations for improving
federal tax and securities law.49 These projects are addressed to legislatures and
42. Id. at 626; see also Fox, supra note 39, at 608.
43. Elson, supra note 17, at 630.
44. As one author writes, “[p]rofessionalism has yielded to commercialization and marketing and
denigration of public service, akin to some business enterprises.” Id. at 631.
45. See How the Institute Works, supra note 1; Elson, supra note 17, at 633–34 (describing the
ALI’s process).
46. Elson, supra note 17, at 634.
47. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 18, at 22.
48. Arthur Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 IOWA
L. REV. 19, 36, 39 (1929).
49. Boskey, supra note 36, at 258–59; Elson, supra note 17, at 628.
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governmental agencies and take the form of explicit recommendations for statutory
language or guiding principles for statutory enactments;50 they are not Restatements
or expositions of existing cases. In the context of all of these efforts, the Restatement
of Copyright Law is but one of many projects aimed at clarifying and explaining the
increasingly complex and numerous court decisions, in this case about copyright law,
to aid practitioners in its application to particular circumstances. Whether the
Restatement of Copyright Law will be widely adopted by practitioners, as have other
ALI Restatement projects, remains to be seen. That it should be attempted and that
it is within the ALI’s mandate is, to us, without a doubt. What then generates
controversy about this Restatement project?51
II. THE INEVITABILITY OF RETELLING THE LAW
The act of restating in the manner that is the ALI’s signature form is consistent
with the practice of law generally, which inevitably involves acts of legal exposition
and interpretation. Stating the law and saying what it means, and then applying it in
a particular context, are what lawyers and judges do all the time. In this way,
restating—or “retelling”—the law is both normal and inevitable, even though
copyright law is based in a federal statute.
To be sure, sometimes restating the law may be difficult and fraught with
controversy. For example, typical difficulties of interpretation arise in the context of
linguistic ambiguity, distances in time and changes of circumstances, and complex
or contradictory historical textual origins.52 Who renders the interpretation may also
raise concerns of subjectivity and the influence of moral or political standards, as
opposed to technical and professional ones.53 This was evident in earlier disputes
among ALI members about other projects.54 These controversies over interpretation
are not new in the ALI or in law generally, and lawyers and judges learn to negotiate
them as part of law’s practice. Like many related disciplines such as history, religion,
and literature, law requires interpretation, and the act of engaging in it is part of its
authoritative endeavor.55 The ALI’s Restatement of Copyright Law project is just
an extension of what it means to engage in the practice of law.

50. Elson, supra note 17, at 629 (describing the Principles of Corporate Governance Project as
stated by Ray Garrett Jr., the first chief reporter of the project); How the Institute Works, supra note 1.
51.
See supra text accompanying notes 5–11 (summarizing the controversy over this project).
52. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–13 (1999) (asking these questions regarding constitutional
law).
53. See GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 160 (2000)
(“Interpretation is objective . . . as long as individual interpreters do not interpret as they wish.”).
54. Fox, supra note 39, at 608 (discussing accusations of bias and special-interest lobbying in the
process of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers).
55. Producing and assessing many versions of what the law is or how it should be applied in a
particular circumstance is essential to law’s legitimacy as an essential socio-political institution. See, e.g.,
PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 15–
20 (1988) (explaining how the inevitability of contrasting accounts of law’s fit and function is essential to
its durability).
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A. THE RESTATEMENT’S PRECURSORS: STARE DECISIS AND TREATISES
Law’s persistence in society as a source of order and control requires law’s
retelling by judges and lawyers and by legally adjacent professionals such as law
enforcement officers, human resource professionals, and tax accountants. In other
words, law’s retelling is central to the rule of law, which is the principle that legal
subjects be treated as equals, reasonably, and not arbitrarily. In order to determine
if the law as decreed is fair and reliable, it must be restated publicly so legal subjects
have the “opportunity to make arguments about the application of legal rules to their
circumstances [and] the public at large may observe these reasons and the arguments
about them.”56 As Paul Gowder writes:
The heart of this conception of the rule of law is responsiveness to reasons. The . . .
rule of law treats people with respect, as minimally capable of responding to reasons
given them by preexisting rules that govern their behavior, while also restricting those
officials who wield coercive power to acting in accordance with those reasons, rather
than simply their own wills. Moreover, they directly recruit the capacity of ordinary
people to reason about reasons by making the use of state force against them conditional
on their having an opportunity to publicly contest and deploy the reasons given by
law. . . . The form of a reason is the opposite of arbitrariness. . . . [T]he official who is
bound to legal reasons at least has to be able to say something that is comprehensible
to the person over whom power is exercised. In doing so, that official treats the other
like an adult, and an equal.57

Law’s public retelling comes in several forms, officially from the state and
unofficially through non-state actors. Before considering the Restatement of
Copyright Law, we concern ourselves with some of the most common official and
unofficial forms—judicial opinions and legal treatises—both of which are precursors
to ALI’s Restatements of Law.
Judicial opinions need no explanation, except to say that they accomplish through
the process of stare decisis the strengthening of the rule of law through redundancy
about and feedback on the rules of law themselves.58 Understood through the frame
of communications theory, Martin Shapiro describes stare decisis as a form of
“incremental modes of decision-making” containing “extremely high levels of
redundancy in the communications linking the decision-making units.”59 He says
further that “the characteristic style of Anglo-American legal discourse persists [as
a] . . . rather standard and routine solution to the noise problem of a non-hierarchical
organization like the courts.”60 Restating the law and the process of stare decisis
maintain order and authority for the rules within a community of diverse actors.
Relying on similar concepts, the U.S. Supreme Court frequently expounds the
importance and centrality of stare decisis to the rule of law. In milestone cases facing
a call to overrule past decisions, the Supreme Court explains that cases must be
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 7 (2016).
Id. at 8.
Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of ‘Stare Decisis’, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 127, 129 (1972).
Id. at 127, 132.
Id. at 134.
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decided in light of previous ones to avoid arbitrariness and that compelling reasons
must be provided to depart from precedent. Predictability, stability, and equal
application of rules are critical to the Court’s own legitimacy. In its most
contemporary extended disquisition on stare decisis, in Planned Parenthood of
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court explained: “[W]e recognize that no judicial system
could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires
such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition,
indispensable.”61 In Casey, the Court outlined several bases for departing from
precedent—unworkability, erosion, lack of reliance, and changed factual
conditions—together which amount to articulating persuasive and substantial
reasons for departing from the established legal rule while also upholding the rule of
law.62 The usual practice of law and reasons for its efficacy include consistent and
transparent reaffirmation of the rules (the precedents) through their repetition
(restatement and application) by courts and lawyers.
Unlike judicial opinions, treatises do not have the force of law and they do not
serve as precedential authority for courts. At best, they are persuasive authority.
They are nonetheless indispensable to judicial decision-making and the rule of law
because they provide information about consistent patterns and outliers in legal
precedent on which courts often rely. The legal treatise has a centuries-long pedigree
that grew out of “the abridgment tradition.”63 As A.W.B. Simpson explains:
The collapse in the seventeenth century of the collective exercises of learning in the
Inns [of Court], the increase in the size of the legal profession, and the proliferation of
nonauthoritative printed texts, could only lend support to the suggestion that the
common law was no more than an ungodly jumble . . . . One reaction to all this had
been practical. From the fifteenth century onwards lawyers had been attempting to
reduce the unwieldy mass of legal materials, sometimes for their own personal use and
sometimes cooperatively, by digesting it under titles arranged, for the want of any better
system, alphabetically. This generated the abridgments and common-place books,
which remained dominant forms of legal literature until the nineteenth century. The
systematizing efforts of the compilers of abridgments could make possible the
production of treatise literature based upon an analysis of the material abridged.64

The “great” treatises would not be written until the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. These include William Blackstone’s Commentaries in England65 and
Joseph Story’s series of nine treatises in the United States.66 The U.S. tradition
culminated in the twentieth century with John Henry Wigmore’s treatise on evidence,
61. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
149 (1921); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16
(1991)). Note the reference in this description of stare decisis to Cardozo, who was instrumental in
facilitating the founding of the ALI.
62. Id.
63. A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 638 (1981).
64. Id. at 639.
65. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765–69).
66. Simpson, supra note 63, at 670 (citing all nine).
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Samuel Williston’s and Arthur Corbin’s treatises on contracts, and Austin W. Scott’s
on trusts.67
As this brief history makes clear, treatises are generally authored by a single
person (although, to be sure, authors usually have administrative and research help).
This means treatises are liable to have character and take positions.68 But, as
Simpson writes, “early American legal writers were anxious to demonstrate that the
enterprise in which they were engaged, the exposition of the American common law,
was a respectable one.”69 At their best, treatises of this genre “unfold the rules, the
principles, the reasons, which not only governed former decisions, but are to govern
subsequent ones.”70 They categorize and order their legal subject to help courts
decide cases. This endeavor becomes especially helpful when no binding authority
exists on the issue in the relevant jurisdiction but cases on point exist in other
jurisdictions that may be unfamiliar or hard to find.71 Treatises also often summarize
and highlight the patterns and themes in cases based on similar or contrasting
statutory language and public policy, which may be relevant to the issues before a
court.72 And treatises provide historical perspectives of changes over time and trends
in the case law that courts sitting in singular jurisdictions may seek to understand
when deciding cutting-edge legal issues.73 The treatise’s biggest limitation—its
singular titular author—is addressed by two of its enduring features: the reputation
of the author (many of whom have been esteemed lawyers or law professors) and its
erudition.74 As Joseph Story explained in his preface to the Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence, demonstrating deep and thorough knowledge of the field: “In many
cases I have endeavoured to show the reasons, upon which these doctrines are
founded, and to illustrate them by principles drawn from foreign jurisprudence, as
well as from the Roman Civil Law.”75
According to treatise historians, the Restatement and uniform legislation projects
are “the most recent expressions of this natural evolution” of a retelling or

67. Id. at 674 (citing these treatises). Wigmore and Corbin were also leaders in ALI Restatement
projects.
68. For critiques on these grounds of the leading copyright treatises and an argument that a
Restatement of Copyright Law is a superior legal resource, see Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright
Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457 (2014); Ann Bartow, The
Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581 (2004).
69. Simpson, supra note 63, at 671.
70. Id. at 674 (quoting JOEL PRENTICE BISHOP, THE FIRST BOOK OF THE LAW (1868)).
71. Richard Danner, Oh, the Treatise!, 111 MICH. L. REV. 821, 829 (2013) (“[T]he precedentbased, multijurisdictional U.S. system ‘was inherently costly to work with. It required time-taking search
for authorities.’” (quoting JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 308 (1950)); see also id. at 833 (describing how treatises “helped harried lawyers make sense of
the raw materials . . . [and] provided context and structure to the flood of published cases”).
72. Id. at 824–25.
73. Id. at 826–28.
74. Most treatise authors have administrative and editorial help, as mentioned above, supra text
accompanying note 68, but this does not affect the evaluation of the treatise’s authorship as emanating
from a single source.
75. Simpson, supra note 63, at 673 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, at iv (1836)).
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summarizing of the law.76 Restatements of law rely on stare decisis and share
characteristics with legal treatises, including their purpose of summary,
categorization, and bringing order to an unwieldy common law. Restatements do
not, however, have the singular author limitation of treatises. And so, drafted by
committee and subjected to multi-layers of approval processes, one might think a
Restatement even more reliable than a legal treatise.
In the case of the Restatement of Copyright Law, questions have been raised about
its legitimacy in light of its statutory context.77 But why should that be so? As the
following Section explains in more detail, a statute is no less in need of interpretation
than the common law. To be sure, the historical focus of most Restatement projects
has been state law with the stated aim of coordinating legal practice in light of more
than fifty distinct jurisdictions.78 This helped facilitate the interstate practice of law.
By design, federal law does not present a coordination problem of the same
magnitude. But that does not render a Restatement of Copyright Law illegitimate.
Federal circuit courts generate circuit splits that are rarely clarified by the U.S.
Supreme Court with its dwindling docket.79 Even in the absence of splits of
authority, as Part III discusses, the current federal statutes have generated more than
tens of thousands of federal court decisions that have left copyright law cluttered and
in need of coordination.80 And, as the following Part also describes in more detail,
the application of central copyright doctrines relies on state law.81 Restating those
doctrines in light of the variation around the nation is useful to achieve the ALI’s
mission of promoting “the clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs . . . [and] to secure the better administration of justice.”82
The 1976 Copyright Act’s retelling in a Restatement as part of its interpretation
and application for future uses is both inevitable and essential because of its statutory
nature: the generality of the Act’s language;83 the change in time and circumstances
since its inception;84 and copious judicial copyright precedent, especially since the
digital age, that has rendered copyright law more relevant than ever before.85 Each
of these factors explains (and may justify) diverse statutory interpretations and
76. Id. at 675.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
78. See Past and Present ALI Projects, AM. L. INST. (Dec. 2020), https://perma.cc/S5C3-SV8N
(listing all ALI projects past and present).
79. Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1219, 1242 (2012).
80. See infra Part III.
81. See infra Part III.
82. How the Institute Works, supra note 1.
83. As Part III discusses in more detail, phrases such as “works of authorship” and “transitory
duration” are at the center of current copyright debates and subject to contested interpretations. As Part
III explains, in some instances and as is common with statutory drafting, the 1976 Copyright Act
intentionally includes ambiguous and broad language in order to be adaptable and flexible.
84. The 1976 Act is now forty-five years old and predates the age of the personal computer and the
internet era. The substantiality of technological, social, and economic changes in copyright industries
since 1976 cannot be overstated.
85. See Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Interventions About Equality in Supreme Court Cases
About Copyright Law, 19 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 280, 280–81 (2020) (describing the rise of
intellectual property cases and the field’s increasing relevance to everyday life in the twenty-first century).
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applications, which collect over time into a mass of “copyright law”—a veritable
common law of copyright, undoubtedly grounded in the 1976 Copyright Act—in
need of “clarification and simplification.” These inevitable features of legal
evolution may produce doctrinal ambiguity and conflict, which the Restatement of
Copyright Law can highlight as doctrinal strands on which legal arguments may be
based. This does not amount to legislating copyright but instead is the kind of
exposition and clarification that have been hallmarks of past ALI projects.86
B. THE RESTATEMENT AS UNREMARKABLE LEGAL INTERPRETATION
We concede that statutory law may be interpreted in a different manner than the
common law within legitimate legal customs and practices.87 But to us, this means
only that one must justify the method of exposition and interpretation, not the fact of
it. This raises the concern already mentioned in Part I about institutional legitimacy
and membership, an enduring tension across ALI projects and not specific to this
one. Once we concede that statutes need retelling—perhaps especially the 1976
Copyright Act88—under what circumstances is the retelling legitimate, and by
whom? This raises age-old questions (in law, as well as in history, religion, and
literature) about clarifying constraints on interpretation to render legitimate the
“restatement” of the subject text by the restatement authors.
Interpretation does not render the text unstable. Decades of debates within literary
criticism make that clear. When Stanley Fish asked in 1982, “Is there a text in this
class?,” he did not mean to render unstable all texts and illegitimate their
interpretations (although some certainly accused him of that).89 His reader-response
theory of literary interpretation was a culmination of decades of literary history and
theory debating the proper disciplinary constraints for reading and retelling of
literature. Could the meaning of a text be found in its words alone? How does the
history of its words dictate their meaning? Will knowing the writer’s biography
facilitate interpretation of her words? How do the imagined or real readers of the
words at the time of writing (or later upon reading) determine the text’s meaning?
86. One might argue that the Restatement of Copyright Law should not address statutory
ambiguities, as any gaps or lack of clarity can be fixed by Congress alone. For the reasons stated in Part
II.B, such an argument mistakenly leaves to the legislative branch a significant job for most lawyers:
interpreting and applying ambiguous statutory provisions in light of new circumstances. Furthermore, the
legislative branch is typically slow to respond to statutory ambiguities and gaps and usually does so only
after lawyers and courts have addressed the issues in practice over time. Waiting for Congress to address
statutory ambiguities hurts litigants and the administration of justice and is contrary to the ALI’s mission.
It also bears emphasizing that a Restatement of Copyright Law is not the Copyright Act. If Congress
wants to fill a gap or clarify a statutory ambiguity, Congress can do that. And if Congress wants to avoid
legislating, it can do that too. But one institution’s delay or avoidance should not be the reason for
another’s, especially when the ALI is not making law and is merely restating it to facilitate others’
administration of it. Finally, the fact that Congress may amend the law (or not) does not make a
Restatement futile. It merely emphasizes law’s unfinished and essentially open character.
87. LIEF CARTER & THOMAS BURKE, REASON IN LAW 68–101 (7th ed. 2004) (describing and
distinguishing statutory interpretation from common-law development).
88. See infra Part III.
89. STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 305 (1980).
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As Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg explain, “Fish initially set out to establish
reader-centered criticism as a more objective rival to the text-centered New
Criticism. Thus, his initial response to the proliferation of conflicting ‘close
readings’ was not to celebrate the creativity of the interpreter, but to seek to better
constrain the interpreter.”90 They further explain that Fish’s “method of doing so
was to . . . focus[] on the role of the reader expectations in structuring the reading
experience.”91 Fish demanded we investigate the “social practice of reading” in
order to identify a shared “system of rules that each [reader] . . . has somehow
internalized” rendering “understanding [of the text] . . . in some sense . . . uniform.”92
This account of literary interpretation was radical if only because it extended and
diversified the origin of authority for meaning beyond the author and the text. In this
way, its result was more democratic if perhaps also more stochastic. And this
generated understandable critiques that focused on whether Fish could deliver on his
theory, whether he was making empirical claims about all readers or just some
readers (or even just one reader), and whether uniformity plausibly exists even
among so-called “interpretive communities” that shared reading experiences and
contexts.93 These were trenchant critiques of Fish’s theory of interpretation, which
produced refinements and focus, as reasoned and open debate often does.94
A “new pragmatism” arose in literary theory that drew on, among other features,
textual genre and genre’s role in constraining the reader’s interpretation (including
by asking genre-specific questions, such as whether something is a poem or a
recipe).95 This had the benefit of retaining the importance of the author’s intent but
also of incorporating the reaction of an expected audience, whose composition will
change over time alongside the evolution of the genre’s contours. Genre is a social
and institutional category as much as a literary one, defining a relationship between
text and audience based on expectations conventionally assigned to words and
textual form in a specific situation.96
What does all this have to do with the Restatement of Copyright Law? A statute,
like a recipe or a poem, is a genre of text.97 As such, it calls out to be read in a
specific way, and lawyers and judges (the text’s typical readers) understand it in this
fashion.98 Lawyers and judges expect that in the statutory context legislatures are
the “authors” and that it is the lawyers’ and judges’ task to give meaning to the
legislature’s policy choices as embodied in the statutory text and structure.99 But it
is not that simple. This task definition begs the question of how to “give meaning”

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140–44.
Id.
Id. at 152–54.
THOMAS BEEBEE, THE IDEOLOGY OF GENRE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GENERIC
INSTABILITY 17–27 (1994) (explaining the inevitability of genre as a discursive mediation that is
inherently unstable).
97. Id. at Chapter Five.
98. Id.
99. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 69.
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to the text as an expression of policy preferences. As Lief Carter and Thomas Burke
write, “[j]udges who arm themselves with dictionaries and expect to find a single,
unproblematic interpretation of a statute expect too much of language—and too little
of themselves.”100 The 1976 Copyright Act is no exception. It contains some very
specific provisions (such as the exemptions of certain performances and displays
from copyright infringement in § 110101) and also uses broad, general language (such
as the subject matter of copyright in § 102102). Communities of readers must
interpret words in the statutory context and attend to evolving factual circumstances.
Given a statute’s complexity and variable relevance in diverse contexts, its
interpretation is likely to generate diverse results.
Statutes are also more than words. They are complex, multi-layered texts
produced over time in the context of committee reports, floor speeches, and
testimony. The 1976 Copyright Act in particular was written over the course of more
than a decade of stakeholder convenings and public hearings with explicit but
broadly worded compromises baked into the statute.103 The industries on whose
behalf those compromises were struck, such as the book publishing, music, and
computer industries, have been so transformed in the digital age that a judge or
lawyer would be forgiven for struggling to interpret and apply statutory provisions
drafted for industries that would be unrecognizable today.104 And yet, they do apply
the statute to new circumstances because that is their job.105 The “interpretive
communities” of judges and lawyers are relatively coherent in terms of professional
standards and norms, driven by consistency among legal institutions and education
(especially as opposed to readers of novels or movie audiences whose diversity is by
definition as varied as the consuming public).106 And yet, the 1976 Copyright Act
(like all statutes) is addressed to readers of uncertain size and scope for a period of
uncertain time.107 Indeed, the authors of the 1976 Copyright Act, writing a “statute

100. Id. at 107.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 110.
102. Id. § 102.
103. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35–76 (2001) (providing a history of copyright
lawmaking in the twentieth century).
104. The music industry—with its transformed distribution and production mechanisms—is only
one such example. The Music Modernization Act of 2019 was one attempt at updating the Copyright Act
in light of these changes. Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.). The Copyright Office describes it as “the most significant piece of copyright legislation in
decades and updates our current laws to reflect modern consumer preferences and technological
developments in the music marketplace.” The Music Modernization Act, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://perma.cc/3L9P-66M2 (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
105. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (describing the function of the judiciary in the
process of applying a federal statute, the Judiciary Act of 1789, is to “say what the law is”).
106. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 10–13.
107. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 149 (“The texts of greatest interest to hermeneutic
theorists—literary, scriptural, and legal texts—are all addressed to groups of readers of uncertain scope.
In discussing legal texts such as legislation, [literary theorist E.D.] Hirsch admits that their authors may
intend to delegate discretion to unknown later interpreters to apply these texts in light of their own
experience.”).
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for the ages,” undoubtedly intended to delegate discretion of its interpretation to
unknown lawyers and judges later in time.108
What justifies this delegation of interpretation to future “restaters” of the law
whose interpretations are expected to extend and amplify the statute’s future
authority? One answer is the rule of law, as stated above.109 Judges and lawyers are
disciplined and incentivized to avoid and constrain individual moral feelings in their
interpretation and application of law.110 Perhaps less like literary critics than Stanley
Fish would like to admit, lawyers and judges participate in clearly delineated
interpretive practices defined by constraining features of legal reasoning, such as
text, precedent, historical record, federalism, and democratic theory.111 Their
professional reputations are staked on adhering to standards of legal reasoning that
promote trustworthiness: transparency, accountability, and evenhandedness.112
Although lawyers often have obligations to advocate zealously for their clients,
lawyers and judges nonetheless must justify their interpretation of the law in a
particular case with reasons resting on impartial grounds mutually agreed upon
within their community of professional colleagues.113 These include stating facts
accurately and comprehensively, correcting legal and factual errors when discovered
and keeping them to a minimum, and justifying choices made among various
possible legal solutions with established rules of the trade.114 If lawyers and judges
are perceived to be manipulating or ignoring these rules to reach partisan, selfinterested ends, cohesion in the community and faith in its object of just dispute
resolution will ebb.115 There is much to incentivize cooperation in upholding the
rule of law among professionals whose primary task is to interpret or “retell” it. And
so, when the legislature relies on future lawyers and judges to retell and apply the
statute enacted decades prior, they are anticipating an interpretive community
constrained by these professional standards and goals of maintaining the public good
of democratic governance. Why would we expect anything less of the lawyers,
judges, and scholars crafting the Restatement of Copyright Law today?
A critic may answer by claiming that this Restatement project has too many law
professors, and the majority of law professors in the copyright field tend to be of a
single mind when it comes to copyright reform. Whether true or not, the criticism
that legal academia produces too much liberal-leaning scholarship is not a new
concern. It was there at the beginning of the ALI, as explained in Part I, and it has
108. See infra Part III.
109. See supra Part II.A.
110. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 3.
111. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982) (describing
the six modalities of interpretation as historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical
arguments).
112. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 136–37; id. at 140 (describing the need for “neutral,
dispassionate . . . dispute resol[ution] [as being] greatest when disputes are most intense and when the
legal decision will have a major impact on the lives of many people”).
113. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1982) (describing
how judicial and other authoritative interpreters of law are constrained by the norms of their communities
of interpretation); see also BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 160–61 (describing Fiss’s work).
114. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 142–50.
115. Id.
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not derailed past Restatement projects. And whether copyright law professors in
particular are somehow more partisan than the other legal scholars (a claim we
dispute but accept for the purpose of argument here), the Restatement community is
much more than law professors. In addition to legal scholars from all over the nation,
Advisors, Liaisons, and Members Consultative Group to the project include
copyright-industry lawyers who work both in-house and at law firms, judges, and
professional organization leaders.116 The prefatory pages to the Tentative Draft No.
1 list affiliations as diverse as the field.117 And even if the concern is of these
Reporters specifically—and we do not know that it is—these Reporters, just like
those from projects before, promise to avoid or disclose all conflicts of interest and
adhere to professional legal norms of honesty and diligence.118 Legal academics,
like other lawyers and judges, are committed to the rules of professional conduct that
include cultivating knowledge of the law, employing that knowledge to reform the
law and strengthening legal education, and advancing the public’s understanding of
and confidence in the rule of law and our justice system.119 The ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct also describe lawyers being “guided by personal conscience
and the approbation of professional peers.”120 We should expect only the “highest
level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal
profession’s ideals of public service” in this Restatement project, as with others.121
If we were to criticize the Restatement project at all as lacking legitimacy of
democratic engagement and inclusivity, it would be a criticism of the Restatement
projects generally, not this one specifically. And this too has been an enduring
tension in the ALI, as Part I explains. This speaks to the difference between
Restatements and other legal authorities. A Restatement is not a judicial opinion or
a legal brief; it is not a statute. If it lacks the breadth of participation we expect from
the most authoritative of legal sources, that is because it is by its very nature an expert
perspective constrained by the experts who participate and the process in which the
opinions are rendered and accepted. Like legal treatises enthusiastically embraced
116. Participants, AM. L. INST., https://perma.cc/YSG2-G65K (last visited Jan. 11, 2021). To be
sure, the Reporter is the lead on the project and, like most Reporters before him (including Wigmore,
Scott, and Corbin), he is a law professor. Christopher Jon Sprigman, NYU LAW, https://perma.cc/8FJEKKER (last visited Dec. 14, 2020). The Reporter’s job as a legal academic cannot reasonably be the basis
to complain about the Restatement of Copyright Law because most past Reporters were academics and
were so designated originally because they had more time to devote to the project compared to full-time
practicing lawyers and judges. Elson, supra note 17, at 636 (explaining time constraints on practicing
lawyers).
117. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020), at vii–ix.
118. Like all ALI members, Reporters must provide “thoughtful, disinterested” analysis and “leave
their clients at the door,” meaning both actual clients and personal self-interest; the ALI’s own rules
require as much. AM LAW INST., COUNCIL R. 4.03 (“To maintain the Institute’s reputation for thoughtful,
disinterested analysis of legal issues, members are expected to leave client interests at the door. . . .
Members should speak, write, and vote on the basis of their personal and professional convictions and
experience without regard to client interests or self-interest.”); Policy Statement and Procedures on
Conflicts of Interest with Respect to Institute Projects, AM. LAW INST. (May 17, 2010)
https://perma.cc/QM6T-NGEC (citing ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble ¶¶ 2, 4).
119. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble ¶ 6.
120. Id. ¶ 7.
121. Id.
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by lawyers and judges and cited with frequency,122 the Restatement is one view on
the state of the law. It is a collective view—not a singular one—and for that reason,
maybe it is an improvement on solo-authored treatises.123 But the Restatement
remains persuasive authority, at best, whose authority is grounded in respect for the
ALI. The ALI Restatements are perhaps more persuasive than amicus briefs and
experts at trial, which are nevertheless encouraged and considered seriously by
courts. Restatements are likely to remain welcome and relied upon as long as
clarification of the law remains necessary and the ALI remains a reputable
professional organization dedicated to the rule of law.
Movements in literary theory over the twentieth century have focused on the same
kind of struggle we see over the meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act in light of
institutional legitimacy. Literary theories of textual interpretation disputed whether
literary interpretation was more like an objective science or a subjective self-centered
performance by the critic.124 But to focus on the literary in law is to miss the similar
and coincident epistemological inquiries among historians, religion scholars, and
legal professionals.125 These disciplines aim to discern through debate the meaning
of authoritative texts and have done so for centuries. Each embraces the process of
retelling as a feature of disciplinary practice, of knowing history, of understanding
religion, and of practicing law. The point is not to avoid retelling, but to explain the
contingencies of that retelling as a matter of disciplinary consensus that justifies the
production of knowledge within each specialty.126
And so we return to the question: What explains the anxiety about retelling this
statute? What prevents a professional consensus from arising regarding the
contingencies of legal interpretation in the case of the 1976 Copyright Act? The
anxiety that a Restatement of Copyright Law will lead to uncertainty, relativism, or
even political polarization is a comment about the specific nature of this text, the
state of the copyright industries today, and the community of interpreters. But these
are old concerns that arose in earlier ALI endeavors and none justifiably undermines
this Restatement project.
As stated above, the statutory genre does not thwart its need for interpretation
because all statutes require interpretation to be effective. And as Part III describes,
this particular statute has certain features making its retelling more necessary, if also
more challenging. The distance from the textual writing and its current application

122. In the copyright field, those treatises include PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT (3d
ed. 2020); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (2020); and WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT (2020).
123. See supra Part II.A.
124. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 147.
125. See, e.g., JAMES L. KUGEL, HOW TO READ THE BIBLE: A GUIDE TO SCRIPTURE, THEN AND
NOW (2012) (discussing and applying ancient and modern biblical interpretive methods); William W.
Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application To American Legal History of the Methodologies of
Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997) (describing methodological debates of interpretation
in history). With regard to constitutional law, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 52.
126. For a notable exploration of this issue in the context of religion, see generally JAMES L. KUGEL,
THE BIBLE AS IT WAS (1997) (explicating how the Bible itself is a retelling of many preexisting religious
and cultural works).
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is substantial in the legal context.127 Although lawyers regularly interpret and apply
constitutions and other laws that are centuries old, the older the texts are, the harder
and more contestable their interpretations may become.128 The technological,
economic, and social changes over the half-century since the 1976 Copyright Act
was passed have made the statute’s contours more relevant and more outdated.129
Courts all over the country are faced with copyright issues on an increasingly
frequent basis in light of the internet era and are asked to interpret statutory language
that speaks of “publication,” “authorship,” and “fixation in a tangible medium” as
they were put into the statute before the internet.130 Lawyers and judges are doing
an admirable job wrestling with the 1976 Copyright Act in a twenty-first century
technological ecosystem, but they are doing it piecemeal, understaffed, and in light
of a growing diversity of clients. What we have, then, is a veritable common law of
copyright since the passage of 1976 Act (and in many cases from before), with
proliferating decisions at rapid rates.131 And in the absence of a new statute, a
Restatement can bring order to this body of law, which is exactly the ALI’s
mission.132 These factors render the stakes of retelling high and the possible
variations in the retelling large. But these factors cry out for the need of a
Restatement, not the avoidance of one.
And so, we are left with the possibility that the “interpretive community” charged
with the Restatement of Copyright Law lacks the legitimacy required to render an
authoritative retelling of the state of copyright law. And this returns us to “new
pragmatism” in literary theory, which wrestled with much the same question thirty
years ago when faced with the unraveling of the field as a university discipline.
Interpretation is a convention-bound activity in which “interpreters are disciplined
by community norms . . . to be found in descriptive or prescriptive accounts of the
institutions within which they read.”133 The source of the illegitimacy is not the fact
of the retelling but the political context in which the telling is rendered.134 The
current political context is unfortunately an increasingly ideologically polarized
nation, dramatic and destabilizing wealth inequality, and enormous threats to the rule

127. See infra Part III.A.
128. WHITTINGTON, supra note 52, at 161 (discussing “intentional fallacy”); id. at 174 (discussing
originalism as “the end of history”).
129. See infra Part III.A.
130. See infra Part III.
131. See Scott D. Hampton & Ashley J. Bailey, Intellectual Property Case Filing Trends Over the
Last Decade, HAMPTON IP & ECON. CONSULTING (Feb. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/YQM5-PGN7
(showing increase by 128% of copyright cases between 2010–2019).
132. This does not concede that a Restatement in the statutory context is any less legitimate than in
the common law context. But a Restatement here brings order and organization to the cases in the absence
of another kind of ordering.
133. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 153.
134. Id. at 114. Binder and Weisberg root the crisis of judicial legitimacy to which legal
hermeneutics responds in the resistance to the interpretation of the Civil War Amendments: “The
legitimacy crisis in which American legal scholarship has struggled for the better part of a century
[regarding constitutional interpretation] . . . [have] roots . . . in enduring cleavages in American society
and politics, and its challenges are political rather than technical. If literary theory is to help us meet these
challenges, it must do so in, and not in place of, politics.” Id.
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of law that rival in intensity the decades just after World War I in the United States,
when the ALI got off the ground.135 Do controversies related to copyright law reflect
this unsettling political context? Maybe.136 We can never really separate ourselves
from the particular time and place in which we are situated. Law is, after all “a
practice that constantly appropriates, reproduces, and reshapes a culture.”137 Doing
law always incorporates materials from the present, precarious moment. But that
does not make the practice of law—its interpretation and application—illegitimate.
As lawyers, we have the capacity to shape and revitalize the very foundations we
worry are being weakened, the professional standards and norms of legal reasoning,
factual determinations, and evenhandedness that are the hallmarks of our
“interpretive community” of lawyers and judges. The Restatement project has the
chance to amplify these essential features of the legal profession and speak to the
central questions of law’s public meaning and value. And we have every reason to
believe the Restatement of Copyright Law will do just that.
In restating the law of copyright for lawyers and judges who seek help organizing
the complex field, the Restatement project is not wresting power from the 94th
Congress which passed the 1976 Copyright Act. The Restatement participants are
engaging in a broader, civic-minded project that all lawyers and judges engage in by
asking how to understand this law (the statute) in light of all the other decisions,
related laws, and constitutions. As James Boyd White has observed, “[i]n both the
identification of texts and their construction, then, the lawyer is engaged in the
special kind of lawmaking that respects certain judgments made by others,” further
stating that “[o]ne could hardly imagine a . . . [task] more naturally public and civic
in its nature, than that . . . in which one constantly gives meaning not only to the
immediate experience of others but to our shared past and present.”138 Restatement
participants are trained in the law, committed to the rule of law, and are participating
in an integrated and democratic process of open debate with people of diverse
perspectives who are experts in the field. As such, there is every reason to think a
Restatement of Copyright Law will be as successful an ALI project as those that
came before.
III. COPYRIGHT’S RETELLING
Retelling copyright law in a Restatement is as natural and useful of an endeavor
as a Restatement of Contracts or Torts, even if copyright law is grounded in a federal
statute. The 1976 Copyright Act, the principal federal statute governing copyright
law, both draws on longstanding common law elucidated by the courts and signals
courts to continue expounding the common law in essential ways. Moreover, as

135. See supra Part I.
136. Silbey, supra note 85 (describing trends in intellectual property cases over the past twenty years
as being increasingly about deeply rooted but contested values, such as equality, rather than about market
competition, which is typically the focus of intellectual property).
137. BINDER AND WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 27.
138. JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL
EDUCATION 176 (2000).
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Congress intimated when it enacted the 1976 Act, it was enacting a copyright statute
for the ages. That Congress has not returned to revise the central aspects of the law
in the past four decades strongly suggests that it was intended for long-term judicial
interpretation. For these reasons, we should welcome a carefully crafted Restatement
of Copyright Law to help courts and lawyers ascertain the central rules of copyright
law. The provisions at issue in the Restatement of Copyright Law draft on which
ALI membership will vote at ALI’s upcoming annual meeting—originality, fixation,
categories of copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, and
authorship and ownership—exemplify how valuable this project retelling copyright
is.139 As set out in subsequent sections, these provisions demonstrate the benefits of
a well-constructed Restatement of Copyright Law.
A. A STATUTE FOR THE AGES
As discussed above, some have expressed discomfort with a Restatement of
Copyright Law, even as they are at ease with Restatements of Contracts and Torts,
because of the single federal statute at the base of U.S. copyright law.140 For
example, some members of Congress recently urged that “laws created through
federal statute, including federal copyright law, are ill-suited for treatment in a
Restatement because the law is clearly articulated by Congress in both the statute and
the legislative history.”141 They elaborated that “any Restatement or other treatise
relied on by courts that attempts to diminish the importance of the statutory text or
legislative history relating to that text would warrant concern.”142 Furthermore, they
suggested that “[c]ourts should rely on that statutory text and legislative history, not
Restatements that attempt to replace the statutory language and legislative history
established by Congress with novel interpretations.”143
But the Congress that enacted the 1976 Copyright Act intended and expected
courts to use common-law decision-making tools to interpret the core of the Act. The
fact that copyright law originates from a federal statute does not obviate the need for
its interpretation, and thus produces proliferating interpretations for reasons already
discussed above in Part II. In particular, the 1976 Copyright Act contains particular
sections, as explored below, that call out explicitly for common-law decision-making
and have evolved in their application over time. These sections are concepts central
to copyright law itself, including originality, fixation, copyrightable subject matter,
the idea-expression distinction, and authorship.144 Specifically, the enacting
Congress drew in large part on courts’ common-law understandings of copyright law
139. We address only those provisions in the tentative draft to be voted on by ALI members at the
upcoming ALI meeting this year. We do not understand other provisions, such as copyright law’s
distribution right as discussed in Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, Restatements of Statutory
Law: The Curious Case of the Restatement of Copyright, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 285, 324–37 (2021), to
be finalized or up for a membership vote at this time.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
141. Letter from Sen. Tillis et al., supra note 9.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See infra Part III.B–F.
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to shape the Act and signaled that courts should continue using its common-law
approach to interpret the Act.145 As such, a retelling of these statutory provisions
and how courts have interpreted them is not only helpful to lawyers and courts in
understanding copyright law, but also accords with the enacting Congress’s statutory
framework. Of course, even with the common-law-making approach that is so
fundamental to much of the copyright statute, the formulators of the Restatement
must take extraordinary care not to deviate from the statute and the courts’
interpretations of that statute, as we discuss in the subsequent sections.
To be sure, there are less central parts of the 1976 Copyright Act—such as the
eleven subsections of 17 U.S.C. § 110 exempting from infringement certain
performances and displays, particularly some nonprofit and educational ones, and
detailed rules in 17 U.S.C. § 111 governing secondary transmissions of broadcast
programming by cable systems—that are less amenable to exposition and retelling.
Because these statutory sections are byzantine in their details, less clarity can be
gained and more accuracy can be lost by retelling them rather than referencing them.
Although Congress has made some amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act,
including the Copyright Term Extension Act,146 the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act,147 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,148 it has left the core
of the Act—with its rules of copyrightability, exclusive rights, infringement, and
exclusions from infringement—virtually intact for the past four decades. When
Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, the most recent major revision of the
federal copyright laws since 1909, it did so in large part because so many
technologies—including motion pictures, sound recordings, radio, television, and
communications satellites—had since become more commonplace and had affected
the creation, copying, and distribution of copyrighted works in ways not anticipated
by and not accommodated in the 1909 Act.149 As discussed in the following sections,
with the 1976 Act, Congress chose to create a copyright statute for the ages by
enacting generally applicable rules that courts could interpret and apply even with
regard to technologies unforeseen at the time.150 Indeed, even though many more
technologies have been created or become popular since—from the VCR and DVR
to the internet to search engines and social media—Congress has not undertaken a
major revision to the 1976 Act, and courts have addressed the implications for
copyright law of such later-developed technologies by applying the 1976 statutory
framework.151

145. See infra Part III.B–F.
146. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 101–106, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827–29 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304).
147. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–706, 104 Stat. 5133, 5133–34 (1990) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–102, 120, 301).
148. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended throughout 17 U.S.C.).
149. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47–50 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 47 (1975).
150. See infra Part III.B–F.
151. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (VCR); Cartoon Network
LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (DVR); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (search engine); Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d
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In light of both the common law-esque statutory framework that Congress enacted
in the 1976 Act and congressional desire to create a statute for the ages, a
Restatement of Copyright Law, done thoughtfully and well, can help guide courts,
lawyers, and law students, just as a Restatement of Contracts or Torts can. If the
distance between the 1909 and 1976 Acts is any indication, Congress will not be
overhauling the copyright laws until approximately 2043. Because of a shift in the
political economy of copyright in recent decades, it might be even less likely that
there is a major overhaul of central aspects of the copyright statute in the near or even
distant future. The 1976 Act itself was the result of decades of negotiation and
compromise among content creators and distributors in various industries.152 Since
then, with the rise of powerful online content intermediaries such as Google, the
landscape has become further divided between those that favor stronger copyright
protection and those that oppose it.153 The shift in political economy provides further
reason to suspect that major legislative changes to the core of the copyright statute
are unlikely, at least in the short term, giving a well-done Restatement of Copyright
Law decades or more to be useful.
We now turn to specific core provisions of the Copyright Act—those governing
originality, fixation, copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction,
and authorship and ownership—to illustrate how the Restatement of Copyright Law
is an appropriate and welcome retelling of copyright law.
B. ORIGINALITY
The Restatement’s provisions on copyright law’s originality requirement usefully
retell the requirement by synthesizing the courts’ longtime common-law
development of originality. This was Congress’s intent when it invoked and inserted
the courts’ understanding of the requirement into the 1976 Act without defining it.
The 1976 Act provides copyright protection to “original works of authorship.”154
In explaining this choice of phrasing, congressional legislative history emphasized
that “[t]he phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined,
is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by
the courts under the present [1909] copyright statute.”155 As the Supreme Court has
made clear in a copyright case (and many other contexts too), “[i]t is . . . well
585 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (social media); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (internet).
152. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857,
859 (1987).
153. Guy Pessach, Deconstructing Disintermediation: A Skeptical Copyright Perspective, 31
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 833, 838–39 (2013); Joel Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law
in the Internet Economy, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1073, 1073–76 (2007).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
155. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 50 (1975); cf. SUPPLEMENTARY
REP. OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 89TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., pt. 6, p. 3 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965) (“Our intention here is to maintain the established
standards of originality . . .”). Both congressional reports elaborated that “[t]his standard does not include
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of
copyright protection to require them.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 50.
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established that where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.”156 By
explaining that it was “purposely le[aving] undefined” the term “original,” Congress
in the 1976 Act was statutorily asking courts to interpret the term in light of the
common-law meaning that the courts had already been attributing to “original.”157
Congress was calling upon courts to continue common lawmaking along the same
general path as they had previously been doing.
In its first major interpretation of the originality requirement under the 1976 Act,
the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. ruled
that “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”158 The Feist Court
derived this interpretation from a long line of cases that understood originality to be
constitutionally required based on congressional authorization to pass copyright laws
protecting the “Writings” of “Authors.”159 Feist distilled its understanding of
originality in part from two nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions.160 One
construed “Writings” to be only those that “are original, and are founded in the
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of
intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.”161
The other construed “Authors” to be “he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker,” and limited copyright to “original intellectual conceptions of the
author.”162 Feist proceeded to elaborate why these analyses mean facts are never
original but compilations of fact might sometimes nonetheless be original.163
In subsequent decisions building on Feist and its predecessors, courts continued
to refine the legal understanding of originality. For example, the Tenth Circuit held
that digital wire-frame models of cars are not original because they “are not so much
independent creations as (very good) copies of [the underlying] vehicles.”164 The
Eleventh Circuit ruled that blank forms for emergency room doctors to record
encounters with patients are not original because they lack creativity for not
conveying information.165 And the Northern District of California held that there
can be sufficient creativity in HTML code to be original.166 As these examples
156. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (internal marks omitted).
157. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 50 (1975).
158. 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1990).
159. Id. at 346 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
160. Id. at 346–47.
161. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
162. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
163. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347–51. For an exploration of the Supreme Court’s originality decisions and
the Restatement’s attempt to “stick to a centrist, sometimes minimalist, narrative of Feist’s two-step
framework” in view of case law concerning copyright in compilations and other works, see Justin Hughes,
Restating Copyright Law’s Originality Requirement, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 383, 409 (2021).
164. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008).
165. Utopia Provider Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Med Clinical Sys., LLC, 596 F.3d 1313, 1319–24 (11th Cir.
2010).
166. Media.net Advert. FZ-LLC v. NetSeer, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1065–67 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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illustrate, courts have continued to apply the common-law framework of originality
clarified in Feist to new situations, new industries, and new forms of expression.
The Restatement of Copyright Law’s treatment of the originality requirement
synthesizes the courts’ common-law approach that Congress anticipated and
specified. Section 5 restates the statutory language—that “[t]he Copyright Act grants
protection to ‘original works of authorship’”—and then Feist’s interpretation of that
language in light of over a century of common lawmaking on originality.167 It says
that “[f]or a work to be original, the work must be independently created by its
author, as discussed in § 6, and must embody expression that is at least minimally
creative, as discussed in § 7.”168
Section 6 explains further that a work is independently created “if the author has
contributed some expression to the work without copying that expression from any
preexisting work.”169 As courts have frequently emphasized,170 the Section’s
Comments elaborate that independent creation does not presuppose novelty, a much
harder requirement to meet: “In order to be independently created, expression must
not be copied in its entirety from any preexisting work; the expression need not be
novel or unique.”171 Furthermore, Comment b to § 6 explains that “[t]he fact that an
author’s expression resembles a preexisting work does not mean that the author’s
expression was not independently created, so long as the author did not, in fact, copy
that preexisting work.”172
Section 7 draws directly on Feist in elaborating the requirement that a work be
minimally creative to be original: “The requirement that a work embody expression
that is at least minimally creative can be satisfied by an author’s creative choices.”173
It continues to explain that “[i]n the case of a compilation, choices regarding the
selection, coordination, or arrangement of elements can satisfy the minimalcreativity requirement even if those elements are not themselves original.”174
Further drawing on Feist and other case law, the Restatement specifies what does
not constitute the requisite minimal creativity: routine choices,175 externally
167. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 5, at 55.
168. Id. Section 5’s Comments elaborate on the constitutional origins of the originality requirement.
Id. § 5 cmt. a, at 55.
169. Id. § 6, at 58.
170. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (“Originality does
not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the
similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of
the other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence,
copyrightable.” (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pics. Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)); Situation
Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Asp. Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009); Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550,
553 (7th Cir. 1956); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
171. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 6 cmt. b, at 58.
172. Id.
173. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 7, at 63 (summarizing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–61).
174. Id.
175. Id. § 7(c), at 63; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 682 (2d
Cir. 1998) (summing up this rule before applying it to the creativity of West’s arrangement of cases)
(citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (alphabetic white pages telephone directory); BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g
Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1444 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (organization of
yellow pages telephone directory)).
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constrained choices,176 and significant investments of labor, time, or skill, without
more.177
The Restatement’s provisions on originality usefully restate copyright law by
synthesizing the courts’ longstanding development of case law on this requirement
in light of new situations and industries. By not defining “original works of
authorship” in the 1976 Act, Congress intentionally adopted the courts’ common-law
understanding of the originality requirement and expected the courts to continue
developing it in future cases. By synthesizing this case law and summarizing it
appropriately in §§ 5–7, the Restatement guides courts, lawyers, and others looking
for an elaboration of the originality requirement that is nowhere provided in the
statute itself.
C. FIXATION
Copyright law’s fixation requirement illustrates a different way in which the
Restatement usefully retells copyright law. With originality, Congress relied on
existing and future common-law development to define the term. With fixation,
Congress expressly directed lawyers and judges to adapt this requirement for future
technologies, leaving the requirement explicitly adaptable to future technologies
without the need for congressional revision. The Restatement collates the various
ways courts have interpreted and applied this forward-looking statutory standard as
technological circumstances have changed.
The 1976 Act provides that to be copyrightable, works must be “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.”178 The Act elaborates that a work is “‘fixed’ in a tangible
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”179 The legislative history on this provision states that “the

176. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 7(c), at 63; see also Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at
682 (summing up this rule before applying it to the creativity of West’s arrangement of cases) (citing Mid
Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1995) (title examiner reports); Victor Lalli Enters., Inc.
v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 672 (2d Cir. 1991) (charts of statistics on horse races)); Comput.
Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying this principle to computer
programs, and reasoning that “a programmer’s freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by
extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular
program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the
industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry”).
177. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 7(d), at 63; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 354
(“Without a doubt, the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine flout[s] basic copyright principles.”). On externally
constrained choices, the Restatement notes that they include “the function the work is intended to serve,
the tools used to produce the work, or practices or conventions standard to a particular type of work.”
Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 7(c), at 63.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
179. Id. § 101.
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definition of ‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or
transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television or other cathode-ray tube, or captured momentarily in
the ‘memory’ of a computer.”180
Congress sought to achieve multiple goals with the fixation requirement in the
1976 Act. First, it inaugurated federal copyrightability at the point of fixation, a time
earlier than under the 1909 Act, which required that a work be published (or
registered) for copyright protection.181 Second, the 1976 Act detailed numerous
criteria required for fixation, including “sufficient[] permanen[ce] or stab[ility]” and
“a period of more than transitory duration.”182 Third, Congress allowed the fixation
requirement to be satisfied when a work could be communicated “either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device,” which overturned a line of judicial rulings that,
to Congress, perpetuated “the artificial and largely unjustifiable
distinctions . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has been
made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed.”183
Perhaps most importantly for present purposes, Congress made clear in its
statutory wording that it wanted to avoid being compelled to revise this fixation
requirement as technologies evolved. Congress specified that the rule would require
fixation “in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed.”184
By adding these last five words, which might otherwise seem unnecessary, Congress
signaled that courts should interpret and apply the fixation standard as they do to
conventional books, films, and other already-existing media also to after-developed
technologies not yet conceived.185
Indeed, as new technologies developed, courts applied and clarified the statutory
standard for new media and contexts.186 Consider videogames. In 1982, the Third
Circuit reasoned that an arcade video game satisfied the fixation requirement even
though “the video game generates or creates ‘new’ images each time [it is played],
notwithstanding the fact that the new images are identical or substantially identical
180. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976).
181. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9–22.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
183. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51 (1975). Congress was thereby
overturning a rule that had principally been established by White-Smith Music Publ’n Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1 (1908), with regard to player piano rolls.
184. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
185. Congress did specifically address one important technology: live broadcasts. According to the
House Report, “the definition of ‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient
reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other
cathode ray tube.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53. Congress made the choice to protect “live broadcasts—
sports, news coverage, live performances of music, etc.—that are reaching the public in unfixed form but
that are simultaneously being recorded.” Id. at 52. It did so by adding the following sentence to the
statute: “A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes
of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
186. Moreover, courts interpreted the fixation requirement as to already-existing media. For
example, a district court held that a bowl of perishable Vietnamese food is not fixed, reasoning that “a
bowl of perishable food will, by its terms, ultimately perish,” and “a bowl of food which, once it spoils is
gone forever, cannot be considered ‘fixed.’” Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d
1046, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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to the earlier ones.”187 The court reasoned that “[t]he audiovisual work is
permanently embodied in a material object, the memory devices, from which it can
be perceived with the aid of the other components of the game.”188 The court also
rejected an argument that the player’s participation in the videogame, which affected
the audiovisual display shown, meant that the game was not fixed, reasoning that
“there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights and sounds
of the game, and many aspects of the display remain constant from game to game
regardless of how the player operates the controls.”189
The Ninth Circuit also found computer software loaded into a computer’s random
access memory (RAM) to be fixed even though the copy is temporary because it is
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”190 As
applied to newly developed DVR technology, the Second Circuit distinguished the
RAM scenario from a DVR system that temporary holds 1.2 seconds of data in a
buffer: “[U]nlike the data in cases like [the Ninth Circuit decision], which remained
embodied in the computer’s . . . memory until the user turned the computer off, each
bit of data here is rapidly and automatically overwritten as soon as it is processed.”191
While the court does acknowledge that the inquiry is fact specific, it concludes that
“these facts strongly suggest that the works in this case are embodied in the buffer
for only a ‘transitory’ period, thus failing the duration requirement” necessary for
fixation.192
The Restatement usefully and properly draws on the statute and this and other
case law interpreting it to clarify the fixation requirement, which was meant to adapt
over time to new technologies. It quotes from the statute in § 8 and uses Comments
to the Section to explain how courts have understood the statutory language. For
example, it specifies that paper books, electronic books, and USB flash drives are all
requisite “tangible medi[a] of expression,” even though the latter two did not exist
when the 1976 Act was enacted.193 It summarizes the “more than transitory
duration” element as not establishing a bright line for fixation’s temporal
requirement, but it also affirms both the Ninth and Second Circuit holdings (that 1.2
seconds in a buffer is not sufficient for fixation, but a computer remaining booted up
for several minutes after loading a program into memory is sufficient for fixation).194
The Restatement helpfully illuminates that “[t]he holdings in the leading cases and
the legislative history suggest that fixation requires an embodiment that lasts long

187. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982).
188. Id. (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
189. Id.
190. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 101).
191. Cartoon Network LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2008).
192. Id.
193. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 8 cmt. b, at 74–75.
194. Id. § 8 cmts. d, g, at 74–78, 81–82.
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enough to allow the enjoyment or exploitation of the work’s expressive content after
the embodiment is initially made.”195
Congress signaled through its articulation of the fixation requirement that it
wanted courts to interpret and apply the elaborate statutory language even to new
technologies not yet developed, and it did not plan to revise this language even upon
emergence of new technologies. As such, the Restatement usefully collects judicial
interpretations of the statutory language both for existing and since-developed
technologies and makes sense of the various fixation opinions in terms of audience
enjoyment or exploitation.
D. CATEGORIES OF COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Retelling copyright law in a Restatement also benefits our understanding of the
categories of copyrightable subject matter. The 1976 Act delineates the extent of
copyrightable subject matter broadly and generally with a non-exhaustive list
referencing illustrative, indeed prototypical, categories of copyrightable subject
matter.
The Restatement helpfully illuminates this subtle framework for
copyrightable subject matter, analyzes why courts have not exploited it to the extent
that they otherwise might, and highlights categories of copyrightable subject matter
that might be less obvious to courts, lawyers, and others.
Until the 1909 Act, each successive copyright statute enumerated a closed list of
categories of copyrightable subject matter. The first U.S. copyright statute, in 1790,
provided protection only to maps, charts, and books.196 Over time, Congress
repeatedly expanded the categories of copyrightable subject matter, by adding new
types of works that could qualify for protection: engravings, etchings, and prints in
1802197; musical compositions in 1831198; dramatic compositions in 1856199;
photographs in 1865200; and paintings, drawings, and statues in 1870.201 The 1909
Act moved away from limiting copyright protection to an enumerated list by granting
protection to “all the writings of an author.”202 The Act further noted that an
enumerated list in the statute for the purpose of administrative categorization of
registration applications “shall not be held to limit the subject-matter of
copyright.”203 Nonetheless, courts and the Copyright Office read the scope of
copyrightable subject matter as being coextensive with the enumerated categories
195. Id. § 8 cmt. d, at 77.
196. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790).
197. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (1802).
198. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831).
199. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, § 1, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (1856).
200. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (1865).
201. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870).
202. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909).
203. Id. § 5. The enumerated list contained books, periodicals, lectures, sermons, addresses,
dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions, musical compositions, maps, works of art, reproductions of
a work of art, drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character, photographs, prints, and
pictorial illustrations. Id. Congress added motion-picture photoplays and motion pictures other than
photoplays to this list in 1912, Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488, 488 (1912), and sound
recordings in 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
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and declined to extend protection to other works, including sound recordings and
choreographic works.204
Even though it might have seemed natural to read the 1909 Act’s treatment of
copyrightable subject matter expansively, it was the 1976 Act that was first
understood to extend copyright protection broadly beyond a list of categories of
subject matter. As discussed above, the 1976 Act extends copyright protection to
fixed, original “works of authorship.”205 The Act elaborates that “[w]orks of
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.”206 The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990
later added “architectural works” to this list.207
Congress was cognizant of the meaning of the word “include” preceding the list
of the seven categories of “works of authorship” in the 1976 Act. The legislative
history explained that “[t]he use of the word ‘include’ . . . makes clear that the listing
is illustrative and not limitative, and that the seven categories do not necessarily
exhaust the scope of ‘original works of authorship’ that the bill is intended to
protect.”208 In fact, a previous congressional study suggested that the use of broader
statutory language for the first time in the 1909 Act “indicated a legislative desire to
escape from rigorous adherence to the objects specifically enumerated in the
statute.”209 Congress did not want to have to legislatively add to the categories of
copyrightable subject matter as it had multiple times since 1790. It sought to create
a capacious sense of copyrightable subject matter by providing protection broadly to
“works of authorship,”210 while also explaining the prototypical and indisputable
204. Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 1955) (sound
recordings); Regulations of the Copyright Office, 21 Fed. Reg. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956); Borge Varmer,
Copyright in Choreographic Works (Study No. 28), in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., COPYRIGHT L. REVISION: STUDS. PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS &
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDIES 26–28, at 94–96 (Comm. Print 1961)
(choreographic works); STAFF OF N.Y.U. L. REV., The Meaning of “Writings” in the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution (Study No. 3), in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT L.
REVISION: STUDS. PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDIES 1–4, at 74–76 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter N.Y.U. L. REV.,
Meaning of “Writings”].
205. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); supra Part III.B.
206. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
207. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended throughout 17 U.S.C.).
208. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52 (1975).
209. N.Y.U. L. REV., Meaning of “Writings”, supra note 204, at 74. That said, the study went on to
observe that “it seems that anything outside the [enumerations] of [the 1909 Act] has little chances for
registration.” Id. at 75. Moreover, the study cast doubt on this restrictive interpretation of the 1909 Act,
in part because Theodore Roosevelt, in his 1905 address to Congress, “when speaking of the need to revise
the copyright laws, part of his description was ‘they omit provision for many articles which, under modern
reproductive processes, are entitled to protection.’” Id.
210. Despite the breadth of copyrightable subject matter, not all subject matter is copyrightable as a
work of authorship. As set out in the legislative history, “there are unquestionably other areas of existing
subject matter that this bill does not propose to protect but that future Congresses may want to.” H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51 (1975).
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categories of copyrightable subject matter by listing them as protected
subcategories.211 As the legislative history explains, Congress set out to list as these
illustrative categories “the general area of copyrightable subject matter, but with
sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope
of particular categories.”212
Congress recognized the need for the statute to adapt to creative practices,
reporting that “[a]uthors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves,
but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will
take.”213 Indeed, since that statement in the mid-1970s, digital books, blogs, internetstreamed videos, and social media posts are only a few new expressive methods that
have arisen. Congress expressed an intent to avoid revising the copyright statute
each time such expressive methods emerged: “The bill does not intend either to
freeze the scope of copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion into
areas completely outside the present congressional intent.”214 It sought to elaborate
copyrightable subject matter so that “neither . . . that subject matter is unlimited nor
that new forms of expression within that general area of subject matter would
necessarily be unprotected.”215
The Restatement elucidates this subtle structure by quoting the statutory language
in § 2 and then explaining further how courts have ruled on expansive claims of
copyrightable subject matter. In particular, § 2’s Comments indicate that although
Congress undoubtedly authorized courts to locate copyrightable subject matter
beyond the illustrative enumerated categories, “[n]o court to date has recognized as
copyrightable any material that falls entirely outside all of the enumerated
categories.”216 This surprising doctrinal development might be explained in several
211. Cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 739–40 (2009)
(explaining how more specific dependent claims in patent law “have a ‘central claim’-like communicative
effect of highlighting prototypes of the associated [and broader] independent claim”).
212. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52. One scholar has argued against this
approach. R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the ‘Next Great Copyright Act’, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489, 1502 (2014) (“Congress is the appropriate and best-positioned actor to
determine what should and should not be protected by copyright, both because the scope of copyrightable
subject matter is a policy question best answered by the elected legislature and because Congress is better
equipped to appropriately tailor any protection it decides to grant.”). Another has argued that there are
principles courts and others can use to deem matter beyond the enumerated categories as protectable works
of authorship. Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78 U. PITT. L. REV.
17 (2016).
213. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51.
214. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51. Even so, the Copyright Office has
refused to register claims of copyright for matters that do not lie within one of Congress’s illustrative
categories of subject matter. Registration of Claims To Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,607 (Jun. 22,
2012).
215. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51. Nonetheless, Congress recognized
that future Congresses might decide to change the bounds of copyrightable subject matter. H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 52; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51.
216. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2 cmt. c, at 11 (giving basketball games and
parades as examples of judicially rejected expansions of subject matter) (citing, in the Reporters’ Notes,
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the enumerated
“list does not include athletic events, and, although the list is concededly non-exclusive, such events are
neither similar nor analogous to any of the listed categories”); Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont’l
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ways. Perhaps courts have not yet found fixed and original works of authorship
outside of the broad illustrative categories that Congress established. Or perhaps
courts lack a clear method to determine whether a new subject matter category ought
to qualify. Alternatively, maybe courts mistakenly believe they cannot protect under
copyright law any matter outside of the illustrative categories listed in the Act. The
Restatement’s Comments include this analysis and diagnose courts’ unwillingness to
expand subject matter beyond the illustrative categories as due to “[t]he breadth of
the definitions of the statute’s enumerated categories of works of authorship, the
paucity of congressional guidance on recognizing other categories of works of
authorship, and the approach that courts and the Copyright Office have taken to
claims of copyright in material falling outside all of the enumerated categories.”217
By providing this empirical information together with an analysis of it, the
Restatement helps courts decide whether and when to extend subject matter beyond
the illustrative categories. Should a future court think other courts unduly restricted
application of the categories of copyrightable subject matter to the enumerated
statutory list, it might rule that a new category is justified under suitable
circumstances. If a court believes that it lacks guidance on the question of adding to
the subject matter categories, it might conclude that a “presumption against copyright
protection for material that falls outside of the statute’s enumerated categories” has
not been overcome and deem the capacious enumerated categories sufficient on
which to rest its decision.218 Either way, the Restatement gives courts a helpful
analytical framework to approach copyrightable subject matter by retelling the
statutory provisions in the context of rendered decisions on the categories of
copyrightable subject matter over the past several decades.
Two other reasons make the Restatement’s attention to categories of
copyrightable subject matter critical for the clarification of copyright law. First, the
category of copyrightable subject matter into which a work is placed can affect the
work’s scope of protection as well as the fact of protection.219 Second, the categories
are not intuitive to non-experts and thus their further explanation in the Restatement
is helpful. For example, § 2 sets out that “[c]omputer programs are protectable under
the Copyright Act as a type of literary work.”220 Although a “literary work” might
seem to encompass only books and periodicals, for example, it is in fact defined as a
work (other than an audiovisual work) “expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal
or numerical symbols or indicia.”221 The Restatement’s Comments explain that
software programs fit literally within this category, that Congress intended to protect

Broad. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1502–04 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (reasoning that a parade is not a “work of
authorship”)).
217. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2 cmt. c, at 11.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (stating that the scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works does not extend to their lawful reproduction in useful articles that are offered for sale or
other distribution to the public in connection with advertisements).
220. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2(b), at 9.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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them under this category, and that courts have followed this view.222 By contrast,
there is no definition of “musical works” in the Act, and Restatement commentary
usefully explains that although “no court decision offers a comprehensive
interpretation of the term, . . . various decisions have identified melody, rhythm,
harmony, and tempo as among the elements of a musical work other than lyrics.”223
The Restatement similarly summarizes the definitions or relevant aspects of the other
categories, as courts have understood them.224
By traversing courts’ interpretations of what constitutes copyrightable subject
matter, the Restatement helpfully sheds light on the subtle statutory framework, how
and why courts have not exploited the extent of this framework, and how to
understand and apply the enumerated categories of subject matter should new forms
of expression arise in the future.
E. IDEA-EXPRESSION DISTINCTION
The “idea-expression distinction” in copyright law is fundamental to the law’s
structure and the subject of ongoing controversy especially in the digital age.225 The
idea-expression distinction is shorthand for various matter—including but not
limited to ideas—that lies outside the scope of copyright, as compared with
expression, which is protectable if it is a fixed and original work of authorship.
Specifically, the Copyright Act of 1976 excludes certain subject matter from
copyright protection: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”226 As the statutory language
attests, unprotected matter extends to subject matter beyond ideas.227 The
Restatement breaks down what appears as a singular statutory rule into
subcategories, each with its own distinct analysis as understood by courts. At a time
when this statutory provision is subject to increasing attention, the Restatement’s
clarification and analysis of the case law will advance copyright practice.

222. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2 cmt. d, at 11–12 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,
at 54 (1976) (writing that the category of literary works “includes computer data bases, and computer
programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original ideas,
as distinguished from the ideas themselves”)).
223. Id. § 2 cmt. e, at 12 (citing, in the Reporters’ Notes, Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244,
1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp.
933, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999)).
224. Id. § 2 cmts. f–j, l, at 13–19 (dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and
architectural works).
225. Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc., No. 18-956 (argued Oct. 7, 2020), currently pending before
the U.S. Supreme Court, is an example of the centrality of this distinction to copyright law and of its
contested status.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
227. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3.1 (2020); Pamela Samuelson, Why
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921,
1921–23 (2007).
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The meaning of § 102(b) requires application of case law as well as close attention
to the enumerated list of categories it contains. It is therefore a statutory provision
whose interpretation demands a combination of interpretive processes described
above.228 As with Congress’s view of its encoded originality requirement in the 1976
Act, legislative history makes clear that § 102(b) “in no way enlarges or contracts
the scope of copyright protection under the present law.”229 Both House and Senate
reports elaborate that “[i]ts purpose is to restate, in the context of the new . . . Federal
system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains
unchanged.”230 Like the originality requirement, this rule is thus well-suited to being
retold in the Restatement of Copyright through an analysis of the case law over
time.231
The Restatement also advances the clarification of copyright law because the
“idea-expression distinction” moniker masks at least three longstanding commonlaw “_________-expression” distinctions that have been clarified over time.232 First,
a process-expression distinction extends to the statutory categories of procedure,
process, system, and method of operation. Second, an idea-expression distinction
covers the statutory categories of idea, concept, and principle. Third, a factexpression distinction exists but is harder to identify literally in the statute’s language
other than with the word “discovery.” These subcategories arise from the
enumerated list and guide the application of this critical statutory provision. The
Restatement’s treatment of this section provides welcome assistance for this complex
but important task.
Though they overlap, the principal policies underlying each subcategory are
somewhat distinct.233 Processes are excluded from the scope of copyright protection
because, as the Supreme Court held in 1879 in Baker v. Selden, “[t]hat is the province
of []patent, not of copyright.”234 For a patent to issue, the Patent Office must
scrutinize the invention claimed in the application for novelty, nonobviousness, and
other strict requirements. Copyrighted material undergoes no such scrutiny or
examination.235 As Paul Goldstein explains, “[d]octrinally, the presence of patent
law’s rigorous standards cautions courts in copyright infringement cases not to allow
copyright, with its notably lax standards, to protect functional elements of
copyrighted works.”236 Ideas are understood differently. As the Supreme Court has
explained, ideas are excluded from the scope of copyright protection so that they can
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See supra Part III.B–C.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 54 (1975).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 54 (emphasis added).
See supra Part III.B.
JEANNE C. FROMER & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 59 (2d version 2020); cf. Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger
Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF U.S.A. 417, 438–39 (2016) (identifying at least six distinctions with
expression in the context of merger doctrine, including idea-expression, fact-expression, law-expression,
process-expression, and system-expression).
233. FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 232, at 59.
234. 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
235. Id.
236. Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1119,
1130 (1986).
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be left free for all to use as building blocks to create further expression.237 Courts
attribute this principle to protecting First Amendment values.238 Courts explain the
exclusion of facts from copyright protection on the ground that they too provide the
building blocks for all expression, but facts also lack originality because they are not
independently created by an author.239 Court cases have applied rules for each of
these distinctions in light of their underlying purposes.240 The Restatement’s
summary and analysis of each exclusion as courts have described them will aid the
development of law, especially regarding information goods and technology, which
are critical areas in dispute today.
In particular, § 12 of the Restatement repeats the statute’s statement that copyright
protection extends to expression but “does not ‘extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.’”241 Section 12 further explains that copyright protection “does not extend to
any fact regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”242 Section 14 specifically addresses the exclusion of ideas
from the scope of copyright protection: “The scope of copyright protection for a
work of authorship does not ‘extend to any idea,’ ‘concept,’ or ‘principle,’
‘regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.’”243 Section 15, which has not yet been released for membership
approval, will address separately the exclusion of methods from the scope of
copyright protection, whereas § 16, which has also not yet been released, will address
the exclusion of facts from the scope of copyright protection.244 As the Comments
explain, the Restatement sorts and groups these items into three categories rather than
deal with the idea-expression distinction monolithically because
[i]n light of the plain language of [the statute], the word “idea” [in this context] is best
understood to operate as shorthand for those elements of a work that by their nature are
not protected by copyright on the basis of underlying policy concerns recognized by
Congress in [the statute] and in judicial decisions interpreting the scope of copyright
protection.245

237. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).
238. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
239. See id; Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
240. For cases that discuss the process-expression distinction, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l,
Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), and Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of Ind., LP v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d
1032 (9th Cir. 2015). For cases that discuss the idea-expression distinction, see Erickson v. Blake, 839 F.
Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Ore. 2012) and Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
For a case expounding on the fact-expression distinction, see Hoehling v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 618
F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
241. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 12(a)–(b), at 115 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
242. Id. § 12 (b)(2), at 115. It then continues that “[t]hese elements to which the scope of copyright
protection does not extend are categorized and discussed in §§ 14 to 16.” Id. § 12(b), at 115.
243. Id. § 14, at 129.
244. Id. § 12 cmt. e, at 120.
245. Id. § 12 cmt. b, at 117.
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Furthermore, the Restatement elaborates that “[g]rouping the statutorily identified
unprotectable elements of a work of authorship into these three categories [of ideas,
methods, and facts] assists in understanding the rationales for, and applications of,
the exclusion with respect to different types of unprotectable elements.”246
Although we cannot yet analyze §§ 15 and 16, the Restatement’s disaggregation
of the idea-expression distinction in §§ 13 and 14 is illustrative. To elucidate the
distinction between expression and other types of matter, § 13 explains that “[t]he
scope of copyright protection for ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression’ extends to expression in a work that is original to the work’s
author or authors.”247 By contrast, § 14 sets out a major category of matter excluded
from the scope of copyright protection: ideas, concepts, and principles, as noted
above.248 A Comment to the Section explains that ideas are excluded from copyright
protection “to ensure that copyright protection will not inhibit others from employing
basic intellectual building blocks or from exploring existing ideas using their own
expression. To encourage authors to create expressive works, copyright must allow
all authors to use building blocks basic to each medium of expression.”249 The
Comments proceed to explain how courts have distinguished unprotected ideas from
protectable expression by using a levels-of-abstraction analysis.250 Because, as the
Restatement notes, courts apply this as a “loose standard” instead of a precise rule,
the Restatement analysis provides a framework that courts may consider when
classifying an aspect of a work as idea or expression: “[T]he focus should be on the
purposes that animate the exclusion—namely, appropriately limiting the scope of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights such that subsequent creators are not prevented
from reusing basic intellectual building blocks or from exploring existing ideas using
their own expression.”251 The reasons for excluding ideas from the scope of
copyright protection may be distinct from those for excluding processes and facts,
something that might not be apparent when they are all lumped together without
analytical structure in the statute in § 102(b). The Restatement helpfully
systematizes the various categorical exclusions, explains why ideas are unprotected,
and describes how that affects an analysis of categorizing material as idea or
expression.
F. AUTHORSHIP AND OWNERSHIP
A final illustration of how the Restatement helpfully illuminates copyright law is
with regard to copyright’s provisions on authorship and ownership. These provisions
rely on common law in other areas, particularly contract, property, and agency. As

246. Id. § 12 cmt. e, at 120.
247. Id. § 13, at 125 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
248. Id. § 14, at 129 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
249. Id. § 14 cmt. b, at 129.
250. Id. § 14 cmt. d, at 130 (citing Nichols v. Univ. Pics. Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)).
251. Id. § 14 cmt d, at 131 (citing Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991);
Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1996)).
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such, the Restatement elaborates these provisions by integrating these other areas of
common law when relevant to illuminate copyright law on authorship and ownership.
The copyright statute provides that “[c]opyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work
are coowners of copyright in the work.”252 A “joint work” is statutorily defined as
“a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”253 The rule
is different for a “work made for hire,” statutorily defined as either “a work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” or “a work specially
ordered or commissioned for use as [one of a number of enumerated categories of
works, including motion picture or test], if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”254
For a work made for hire, “the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised
in the copyright.”255
The statute also provides that these rights can be transferred: “The ownership of
a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or
by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by
the applicable laws of intestate succession.”256 The statute explains further that a
transfer of copyright ownership is “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or
any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place
of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”257 The statute specifies that for
such a transfer to be effective, other than if it is by operation of law, there must be
“an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer . . . in writing
and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized
agent.”258
These provisions depend in substantial part on other areas of the common law,
especially contract, property, and agency laws, and courts have interpreted these
statutory provisions on authorship and ownership in light of those areas of the law.
For example, the Supreme Court has understood the statutory provisions on works
made for hire as Congress codifying the common law of agency. In seeking to
understand when a work was prepared by “an employee within the scope of his or
her employment,” as the statute requires, the Supreme Court explained: “The Act
nowhere defines the terms ‘employee’ or ‘scope of employment.’ It is, however,
well established that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled
meaning under . . . common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
Id. § 101.
Id.
Id. § 201(b).
Id. § 201(d)(1).
Id. § 101.
Id. § 204(a).
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dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms.’”259 The Court concluded that the statute suggests “Congress’ intent to
incorporate the agency law definition” of “employee” into the copyright statute.260
Citing the Restatement of Agency, the Court then elaborated the thirteen factors that
must be considered to determine whether a work is created by an employee, including
“the source of instrumentalities and tools” and “the provision of employee
benefits.”261 Other federal courts have similarly interpreted the requirement that the
work done be in the “scope of employment” to be adjudged by common-law agency
principles.262
Also consider the law of joint works, which relies not on agency law but property
law. As Congress explained in the legislative history to the 1976 Act, “[t]here is . . .
no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and duties of the coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed.”263 The
legislative history further specified that “[u]nder the bill, as under the present law,
co-owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common.”264 From
this legislative direction, courts have relied on the common law of property to grant
co-authors of a joint work an undivided fractional interest in the work.265
These statutory provisions also rely heavily on the common law of contracting to
define rights with regard to joint works, works made for hire, and transfers of
ownership. For example, courts refer to contracts when assessing whether the
putative co-authors intended a work to be a “joint work.” The Ninth Circuit has
specifically held that “[t]he best objective manifestation of a shared intent . . . is a
contract saying that the parties intend to be or not to be co-authors.”266 Additionally,
for a work to be made for hire by an independent contractor, “the parties [must]
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.”267 And a work that otherwise would constitute a
work made for hire may instead be owned by the employee if “the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them.”268 Finally, the
259. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (quoting NLRB v. Amax
Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
260. Id. at 740.
261. Id. at 751–52 (notes omitted; citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)). The full
list of factors is “the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished”; “the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to
work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is
part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.” Id.
262. E.g., Avtec Sys. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 228).
263. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 106 (1975).
264. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 106 (1975).
265. E.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991); Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 480
(9th Cir. 1978).
266. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000).
267. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
268. Id. § 201(b).
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statute requires “an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the
transfer . . . in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such
owner’s duly authorized agent” for a transfer of ownership by voluntary
conveyance.269 These requirements are similar to and draw on writing requirements
in contract law, combining the common law of contracts with the 1976 Copyright
Act for its proper application.270
The Restatement sheds light on how these other areas of common law—agency,
contract, and property—interact with copyright’s statutory provisions on authorship
and ownership. The Restatement does so by including these other legal areas in its
retelling of copyright law. For example, § 22, which governs joint works, explains
how contracts may be helpful, but not always dispositive, in assessing whether a
work is co-authored. It states after quoting the statutory definition of a “joint work,”
that “[t]o have the requisite intent to be a co-author of a joint work, an author must
intend, at the time the author creates that author’s contribution to the work, that the
contribution be merged into a joint work as a unitary whole.”271 A Comment to § 22
elaborates that “[e]xpress statements of intent—for example, in a contract between
co-authors—are strong evidence that the parties making the statements possessed the
requisite intent.”272 Another Comment emphasizes the helpfulness of contracting by
providing that
an express agreement among the contributors that a particular contributor will be listed
as a co-author of the work would offer evidence to support a finding that the
contributions made by that particular contributor were sufficient to qualify the
contributor as a joint author; contributors are generally unlikely (absent a contrary
industry custom) to agree to list as a co-author a contributor who does not make what
they regard as an authorial contribution to the work as a whole.273

The Restatement Comments also recognize, however, that a contract directed to coauthorship may not be definitive: “[A] contract in which parties agree to be coauthors of a work cannot make someone a co-author of a joint work if the
requirements discussed in this Section are not met.”274
Sections 22 and 23 elaborate the role of the common law of property in ownership
of joint works. Section 22 provides that “[t]he co-authors who create a joint work
are the initial co-owners of the copyright in that joint work, as specified in § 23.”275
Section 23 further specifies that “[u]nless the co-authors of a joint work have agreed
otherwise, each co-author owns an equal undivided fractional interest in the
copyright in the entire joint work.”276 Due to this ownership, § 23 provides that any

269. Id. § 204(a).
270. Kongsberg Int’l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that this “writing
requirement not only protects authors from fraudulent claims” much like a statute of frauds, but it “also
enhances predictability and certainty of ownership”).
271. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 22(c), at 165.
272. Id. § 22 cmt. c, at 166.
273. Id. § 22 cmt. e, at 173.
274. Id. § 22 cmt. f, at 173.
275. Id. § 22(d), at 165.
276. Id. § 23(a), at 187.
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co-author can exercise the rights of a copyright owner or authorize another to do so
nonexclusively subject to a duty to account to the other co-owners or to transfer its
fractional interest, but the co-owners unanimously can act together to authorize
another to exercise exclusive copyright rights or to transfer the entire copyright.277
With regard to works made for hire, § 24 of the Restatement explains the
relevance of the common law of agency to the statute’s interpretation: One way for
a work to be made for hire is if it is “‘prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment’ as determined under the general common law of agency.”278
Comments to this Section explain how courts have used this common law of agency
to determine whether someone is an employee acting within the scope of their
employment.279 Section 24 also underscores the relevance of contracting, whether
to transform a work created by an independent contractor into a work made for hire
or to deem a work created by an employee within the scope of their employment not
to be a work made for hire.280 The Comments elaborate on the content and timing
of such agreements by describing many court decisions arising in diverse contexts
and industries.281
Finally, with regard to transfers of copyright, § 25 of the Restatement states that
“[t]o be valid, transfers by voluntary conveyance . . . must satisfy the written
instrument requirement addressed in § 26.”282 Section 26 expands on the written
instrument requirement by quoting the statutory language governing transfers: “A
transfer of copyright ownership by voluntary conveyance, as described in § 25(b)(1),
‘is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the
transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s
duly authorized agent.’”283 The Section explains that “[t]his is known as the written
instrument requirement.”284 The Restatement then helpfully explains the array of
circumstances when the written instrument requirement does not apply: to “nonexclusive licenses” (because they are excluded from the statutory definition of
transfers of copyright),285 transfers under the terms of a will or by intestate
succession,”286 and “transfers by operation of law” (because they are not transfers by
voluntary conveyance).287 The Restatement Comments disaggregate the written
instrument requirement into three elements: “an instrument of conveyance, or a note
or memorandum of the transfer”; “in writing”; and “signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”288 The Comments summarize the
case law and other statutes governing each of these elements, including that the

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. § 23(b), at 187.
Id. § 24(a)(1), at 208.
Id. § 24 cmts. c–d, at 209–15.
Id. § 24(b)–(c), at 208.
Id. § 24 cmts. g–h, at 218–22.
Id. § 25(c), at 232.
Id. § 26, at 249 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)).
Id.
Id. § 26(b)(1), at 249.
Id. § 26(b)(2), at 249.
Id. § 26(b)(3), at 249.
Id. § 26 cmt. d, at 250 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)).
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writing can have been prepared for another purpose and can have been signed
electronically,289 and that courts have split on the legitimacy of a writing post-dating
the agreement to transfer.290
The Restatement provides a robust retelling of copyright law by integrating the
external common law of contract, agency, and property on which copyright’s law of
authorship and ownership relies. These aspects of copyright law are central to the
law’s operation in the creative and innovative industries, which have dramatically
evolved since the 1976 passage of the Copyright Act. The Restatement’s framework
for and clarification of this complicated area of law will be a welcome resource for
lawyers, judges, and students.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Restatement of Copyright Law is a useful retelling of copyright
law. This Restatement project fits well within the ALI’s mandate.291 The act of
restating in the manner that is the ALI’s signature form is also consistent with the
legal practice, which inevitably involves acts of legal exposition and interpretation,
even for statutory law.292 The copyright statute draws on longstanding common law,
gestures to courts to continue developing this common law to interpret the statute,
and is a statute for the ages. Judges and lawyers—whatever their views on copyright
policy—should embrace this carefully crafted Restatement draft on originality,
fixation, categories of copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction,
and authorship and ownership, to guide legal practice and decision-making in
copyright law.293

289. Id. § 26 cmt. e, at 250–51; id. § 26 cmt. g, at 251–52 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1)).
290. Id. § 26 cmt. i, at 253–55 (citing, inter alia, Konigsberg Int’l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355 (9th Cir.
1994); Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2011)).
291. See supra Part I.
292. See supra Part II.
293. See supra Part III.

